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HOPE AND CHALLENGES IN LONG-TERM SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS 
SANDRA H. JOHNSON* 
The U.S. Congress established the Commission on Long-Term Care 
(Commission) in 2012. Its charge was to identify a plan for the financing and 
implementation of a “comprehensive, coordinated, and high-quality system”1 
for the delivery of long-term services and supports for the full range of 
persons—both young and old—who live with serious physical or cognitive 
limitations. Unlike many current efforts to address substantial questions of 
access to essential care and services, the Commission was a bipartisan effort 
with its members appointed by the President and the leadership of both parties 
in Congress.2 Even though it was not plagued by the ideological wars that have 
characterized other health reform initiatives, the Commission fell short of 
accomplishing its ultimate task. The Commission’s work produced an official 
report and recommendations3 supported by only nine of its members (including 
members picked by both Democrats and Republicans) with six of its members 
(also representing both parties) rejecting the report.4 Five of the Commission 
members who rejected the official report and recommendations produced a 
dissenting report and recommendations.5 With only six months to do its work, 
it is not surprising that the Commission didn’t meet its goal, but attributing its 
failure solely to the press of time would be mistaken. In fact, the essential 
challenge set by Congress for the Commission was to create an entirely new 
system where none exists. Merely refining or expanding current finance and 
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 1. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 643(b)(1), 126 Stat. 
2313, 2358 (2013) [hereinafter American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012]. 
 2. Commission members were selected by both parties, nine by Democrats and six by 
Republicans. Id. § 643(c)(1). 
 3. COMM’N ON LONG-TERM CARE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2013) [hereinafter 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. COMM’N ON LONG-TERM CARE, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO LONG-TERM 
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2013). [hereinafter DISSENTING REPORT] The Commission members 
signing on to the Dissenting Report are Laphonza Butler, Henry Claypool, Judith Feder, Lynnae 
Ruttledge, and Judith Stein. Id. 
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delivery systems for long-term care and support for the twelve million persons 
who currently require these services,6 as well as for their families and 
caregivers, will not get the job done, as the fine articles in this Symposium 
effectively illustrate. 
Although the Commission was divided on solutions, the need to make 
progress in the financing and delivery of long-term care and support is quite 
urgent. In its official report, the Commission emphasizes that the number of 
persons needing long-term care and support services is growing exponentially 
while the number of family caregivers available to provide essential and 
usually unpaid services is declining.7 Currently, public programs pay for two-
thirds of the cost of long-term services and supports, and the demographics of 
the increasing need for services and the decreasing pool of unpaid caregivers 
portend a public budget crisis as well as unbearable private costs. As the 
Commission report states: “The need is great. The time is now.”8 
Communicating this sense of urgency, however, is difficult as the 
financial, physical, and emotional costs of caring for persons in need are 
essentially invisible. Currently, obligations of care and financing are borne 
largely by family caregivers and at great cost. Nearly eighty percent of persons 
in need of long-term services and supports live at home and receive assistance 
solely from family and friend caregivers.9 Although estimates vary somewhat, 
caregivers generally provide seventeen to twenty-two hours of care weekly 
over an average duration of 4.6 years.10 Nearly seventy percent of these so-
called “informal caregivers” report having to adjust their employment 
(rearranging their work schedule, taking unpaid leave, or decreasing work 
hours).11 Clinically significant symptoms of depression arise in forty to seventy 
percent of informal caregivers, and approximately twenty percent report a 
decline in their own health.12 
In addition, many of the services most needed by this population are often 
not viewed as “health care” and so have not been incorporated into the 
 
 6. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. Id. at 6. 
 9. DISSENTING REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
 10. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 4-5 (2009). 
 11. LYNN FEINBERG ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., VALUING THE INVALUABLE: 2011 
UPDATE: THE GROWING CONTRIBUTIONS AND COSTS OF FAMILY CAREGIVING (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 UPDATE], available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ltc/i51-caregiving.pdf; 
LYNN FEINBERG & RITA CHOULA, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF 
FAMILY CAREGIVING ON WORK (2012), available at http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/re 
search/public_policy_institute/ltc/2012/understanding-impact-family-caregiving-work-AARP-
ppi-ltc.pdf. 
 12. Selected Caregiver Statistics, Mental and Emotional Effects of Caregiving Experienced 
by Caregivers, Impact of Caregiving on Caregiver’s Physical Health, FAMILY CAREGIVER 
ALLIANCE, https://caregiver.org/selected-caregiver-statistics (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
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mainstream health care delivery system. Instead, these essential supports—
assistance in bathing, transfer, cooking, transportation, financial management, 
cueing—are viewed as lying outside the scope of health insurance and outside 
the responsibility of health care providers. Consistent with this framework, the 
Commission’s report addresses “long-term services and supports” as distinct 
from “health care services.”13 
Finally, in my experience, there is also a hefty dose of denial in discussions 
about the personal risk of seriously debilitating medical conditions due to 
illness or injury or accompanying advanced age. The denial of personal risk of 
needing long-term care and support is particularly puzzling when the financial 
and health risks of providing uncompensated aid to a family member or friend 
are taken into account. Failing to view this risk as shared among all of us 
produces a view that the responsibility for care and financing lies with the 
individual rather than the community as a whole. In fact, the report issued by 
the dissenting members of the Commission emphasizes that “we’re all at risk” 
and offers this realization as a prime motivation for moving forward on public 
policy regarding long-term services and supports.14 Finally, the prospect of 
shifting the very substantial costs of long-term services and supports out of the 
private circle of family and friends (currently estimated at equivalent to $450 
billion of unpaid services annually)15 and into the public sphere is daunting. 
In the first article in this Symposium, Marshall Kapp delves into the 
complexities of the Medicaid payment system for long-term care. Currently, 
the federal-state Medicaid program is essentially the only public financing 
program that pays for substantial long-term care services with the Medicare 
program paying only for very narrowly bounded services for nursing home or 
home care. Kapp rightly points out that the focus of Medicaid financing 
historically has been on institutional nursing home care. In fact, much of 
Medicaid financing of non-institutional long-term care has grown out of efforts 
to reduce the costs to state budgets of nursing home care rather than as a 
coherent effort to provide adequate services and support in the community. 
Kapp argues that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) did very little of substance to 
address the availability of long-term care and services especially in the context 
of community-based services.16 While the ACA did little on its own, however, 
 
 13. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. 
 14. DISSENTING REPORT, supra note 5, at 17. 
 15. 2011 UPDATE, supra note 11. 
 16. The ACA included Community Living Assistance Services and Support Act (CLASS) to 
increase private coverage of long-term-care services and to expand non-institutional care for frail 
individuals. The financing plan for CLASS involved a voluntary payroll deduction plan, with 
significant limits on premiums and a floor for benefits, and was to be implemented only if it could 
be operated without deficit. Failing this requirement, CLASS was repealed in the same statute 
that established the Long-Term Care Commission. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, supra 
note 1, § 642. 
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Kapp points out that the Act created opportunities for the states to shift their 
Medicaid payment policies more toward community-based services should 
they choose to do so. It is Kapp’s hope that indeed they will. 
In the second article in this Symposium, Katie Dean and David Grabowski 
argue that financing and payment reforms in long-term care must be tied to 
reform in delivery systems to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness. 
Focusing on services for persons whose care is paid for by both Medicare and 
Medicaid (usually referred to as dual eligibles), Dean and Grabowski paint a 
landscape of costly dysfunction where financial incentives stimulate excessive 
costs, poor outcomes, and discontinuity of care. Their major point is that 
payment reform standing alone will not produce “comprehensive, coordinated 
and high-quality” care for persons needing long-term care. They prove this 
point by examining the outcomes of the demonstration project on Nursing 
Home Value-Based Payment, conducted from 2009 to 2012. The project 
provided financial incentives to nursing homes for performance improvement 
on a number of factors designed to improve outcomes of nursing home care 
and to reduce unnecessary hospitalization. Studies of the impact of the 
payment project demonstrated, however, that there was little change in 
behavior regarding nursing home to hospital transfers despite financial 
incentives. Dean and Grabowski make a compelling argument that payment 
reform is inadequate standing alone to stimulate improvement in both quality 
and efficiency in long-term care and that serious reform is needed in the design 
of systems through which care is delivered. 
Judy Feder, who served as a member of the Commission and who signed 
the dissenting report, addresses the foundational issue of allocating the risk of 
long-term care expense as between individuals and the larger community. 
Feder marshals compelling evidence concerning the risk of catastrophic long-
term care expense. She effectively demonstrates that the incidence and 
magnitude of risk of need for long-term services and supports fit the classic 
presentation of insurable risks, i.e., risks that are best handled by spreading 
across as broad a population as possible. She also demonstrates, however, why 
a private insurance system is unequal to the task and why a public-private 
partnership in insuring for long-term services and supports is essential. Her call 
is buttressed by the human costs, which she describes, of abandoning patients 
and caregivers to their own resources. 
In her contribution to the Symposium, Laura Hermer examines the issues 
surrounding the relative lack of support for non-institutional home and 
community-based services (HCBS) for long-term care. In describing the 
history of Medicaid coverage for HCBS, Hermer explains the reason that 
publicly financed HCBS operates as a disjointed patchwork rather than as a 
system and, further, why access to HCBS is so inadequate. Acknowledging the 
growing proportion of the Medicaid long-term care dollar that goes to HCBS, 
Hermer nonetheless identifies several significant obstacles to the emergence of 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] FOREWORD 5 
an adequate and coherent system of publicly financed non-institutional long-
term care. She points, for example, to the fear that expanding payment for non-
institutional services will increase state Medicaid budgets and that support for 
self-directed care will produce a “woodwork effect” in which previously 
unpaid family care will land on the public budget. Hermer argues that a 
federalization of payment for HCBS is important to resolve the inadequacies of 
the current patchwork approach. She cautions, however, that political support 
is a determining factor in whether better access to necessary long-term care in 
the community will be available. 
Finally, Malcolm Harkins addresses one of the most persistent issues in 
nursing home care: the question of the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
regulatory efforts to ensure that public dollars are purchasing and residents are 
receiving care that is of adequate quality. Harkins’ article provides an 
interesting history of the development of the federal Nursing Home Reform 
Act in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA 1987).17 
OBRA 1987 represented a radical reform of nursing home regulation and 
survives today, thirty years after its enactment, as the core of federal regulation 
of the quality of nursing home care paid for by Medicare and Medicaid. 
Harkins acknowledges that the consensus among resident advocates and 
providers both is that the quality standards adopted in OBRA 1987 are still 
viewed as “appropriate and largely well done” and that the enforcement 
remedies are “likewise generally appropriate.” Harkins is highly critical, 
however, of the inspection process used by the state and federal governments 
to measure performance of individual nursing homes. In particular, Harkins 
notes that the survey protocols used to monitor nursing home quality produce 
inconsistent and inaccurate results. Although the incidence of undetected or 
uncited violations of standards (false negatives) exceed the incidence of 
inappropriately cited violations (false positives) by a factor of four to five 
times, Harkins emphasizes that both are equally inaccurate. He faults the 
political arena for highlighting only the false negatives and using that data as 
evidence that the inspection process is too lax. Harkins presents in great detail 
both the necessity of and the challenges to developing an inspection process 
for nursing homes that would be both consistent and accurate. He emphasizes 
particularly that the operation of the CMS consumer-oriented Nursing Home 
Compare web site magnifies the impact of inaccuracies in survey results. 
Harkins focuses exclusively on nursing home regulation, but his 
documentation of the experience of CMS in attempting to restrain surveyor 
judgment in detecting violations of outcomes-oriented standards over the past 
nearly thirty years since OBRA 1987 should be a caution to current efforts to 
move health care regulation generally toward outcomes standards. It may 
 
 17. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-1339 (Dec. 
22, 1987). 
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appear, for example, that measuring performance on outcomes standards would 
be a relatively data-driven, nondiscretionary exercise. Indeed, if outcomes 
standards are simplistic, rely on easily available data, and are applied over a 
sufficiently large number of individuals, monitoring outcomes performance is 
likely to reflect that simple design. If outcomes standards operate over smaller 
populations, especially when applied to individuals, and incorporate more 
clinically complex standards, however, it is likely that clinical discretion in the 
detection of violations in individual facilities will take on more complexity as 
well. 
Each of the articles in this Symposium details the great challenges present 
in moving toward a financing and delivery system that will assure 
“comprehensive, coordinated, and high-quality” care and support. There is a 
small but quite effective Medicare/Medicaid payment and delivery system, 
however, that demonstrates success on many of the points made by the authors 
of the articles in this Symposium, including the emphasis on community-based 
care, the need for a broader definition of long-term care services beyond what 
is usually considered health care, and the necessity of focusing on redesign of 
delivery systems as well as forms of payment. The Program of All-Inclusive 
Care for the Elderly (PACE) is a model of community-based long-term care 
for Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries, and its performance provides a 
hopeful counterweight to the rather discouraging documentation of the 
obstacles to reform. 
The original prototype for PACE, On Lok Senior Health Services, 
developed in the 1970s in San Francisco among Asian communities and 
eventually received federal grants to test payment and delivery systems for all-
inclusive care for the elderly. Finally codified in the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997,18 the first PACE program to be fully qualified for Medicare and 
Medicaid was established in St. Louis in 2001 by the Alexian Brothers who 
continue to operate the program.19 PACE is a small program nationally, 
currently numbering 106 programs in thirty-one states (up from forty-two 
programs in 2007),20 but it holds lessons for those interested in creating a 
system of long-term services and supports for individuals with the most 
complex medical conditions and challenging living environments. On average, 
PACE participants are eighty years old, have eight or more medical conditions, 
and are taking twelve different medications upon their enrollment in PACE. A 
diagnosis of dementia is prevalent with forty-eight percent of the PACE 
 
 18. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4802(a), 111 Stat. 251 (1997); 42 
U.S.C. §1396u-4 (2012). 
 19. National PACE Association: Who, What and Where is Pace?, NAT’L PACE ASS’N, 
(2015), http://www.npaonline.org/website/article.asp?id=12&title=Who,_What_and_Where_is 
_PACE. 
 20. Id. 
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population having been diagnosed with the condition.21 Studies of PACE 
participants indicate that the PACE population is older and more cognitively 
impaired than the population receiving care through home health care or 
nursing homes.22 
All PACE participants must meet the criteria for admission to a nursing 
home under state requirements for Medicaid,23 but PACE is designed to 
support these individuals in their own homes, reducing costs significantly. 
PACE payments are capitated, with rates varying considerably among the 
states. In exchange for the capitated payment, PACE bears all risks for an 
enrollee’s health care, including hospitalizations and skilled nursing home care 
should the participant require those services.24 PACE is a model of the reform 
advocated by Dean and Grabowski. It focuses intensely on systems for the 
delivery of care and support rather than relying solely on capitated payment for 
hoped-for but elusive gains in efficiency and health outcomes. Within the 
capitated payment allocation, PACE provides enrollees with social supports, 
wellness interventions, family respite, and transportation as well as all of their 
medical care. Although participants live at home, PACE programs operate 
physical sites that provide social events, lunch, and a complete health care 
clinic. PACE programs aggressively follow the care of their hospitalized 
enrollees to assure that care is appropriate and effective and intervene after 
discharge to assure continuity of care and to avoid readmission. Empirical 
research on PACE outcomes demonstrates consistently that PACE is effective. 
Mortality risks for PACE participants are significantly less than for individuals 
receiving home health care services or nursing home care.25 As to the rate of 
hospitalization highlighted by Dean and Grabowski, PACE achieves 
significant results when compared to hospitalization of individuals residing in 
nursing homes or receiving home care. In a study published in 2014, hospital 
admission rates for PACE participants were twenty-four percent lower than 
hospitalization rates for dual eligibles residing in nursing homes and forty-
three percent lower than dual eligibles receiving community-based care outside 
of PACE. Examining “potentially avoidable” hospitalizations, the study 
concluded that the PACE rate for this category of admissions was forty-four 
 
 21. National PACE Association: Who does PACE Serve?, NAT’L PACE ASS’N, (2015), 
http://www.npaonline.org/website/article.asp?id=50&title=Who_Does_PACE_Serve?. 
 22. See, e.g., Darryl Wieland, et al., Five-year Survival in a Program of All-Inclusive Care 
for the Elderly Compared with Alternative Institutional and Home-and-Community-Based Care, 
65 J. GERONTOL. A: BIO. SCI. & MED. SCI. 721 (2010). 
 23. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS PUB. NO. 11341, QUICK FACTS FOR 
PROGRAMS OF ALL-INCLUSIVE CARE FOR THE ELDERLY (PACE) (2008), available at 
http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11341.pdf. 
 24. Micah Segelman, et al., Hospitalizations in the Program of All-Inclusive Care for the 
Elderly, 62 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 320, 320 (2014). 
 25. See generally Wieland, supra note 22. 
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percent lower than individuals residing in nursing homes and sixty percent 
lower than those receiving non-PACE community-based care.26 
PACE offers a model of care that departs significantly from the range of 
long-term services and supports generally available to persons living with 
serious limitations in physical or mental functioning. Similarly, each of the 
articles in this Symposium envisions a better system of caring for the large 
numbers of persons of all ages who need significant support over the long-term 
to survive and thrive. One hopes that the spotlight that the Commission 
brought to these issues and the sophisticated and passionate work of the 
scholars participating in this Symposium will help prepare us for the 
unavoidable demographics of the future. There is nothing simple, however, 
about health care reform, whether it involves payment reform, reform in 
delivery systems, or reform in the tools used to monitor quality of care. This is 
especially so where, as in the case of long-term care, the needs have been 
ignored for so long. 
 
 
 26. Segelman, supra note 24, at 322. 
